12/03/2026
For decades, professional sports have consolidated as an industry of significant economic impact, in which competitions constitute a structured product that depends on coordination among clubs which, although competitors on the field and in the commercial exploitation of their brands, must cooperate to enable the very existence of the championship. The definition of calendars, participation rules, and organizational criteria require centralized governance models, usually exercised by associations or entities with regulatory and disciplinary functions. This institutional architecture is not accessory, but rather a functional element of the industry.
The uniqueness of this arrangement, however, does not exclude the application of Competition Law. On the contrary, the organization of competitions and the economic exploitation of the assets arising therefrom constitute activities fully embedded in market logic.
Competition law debate on sports governance has gained more defined contours in different jurisdictions in this context.
In Europe, the initiative to create an independent competition by the European Super League Company led UEFA and FIFA to react by threatening sanctions against the clubs and athletes involved. The dispute brought before the courts focused on the requirement of prior authorization by FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) and UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) for the creation of new interclub competitions and on the compatibility of this mechanism with the EU competition rules particularly with the competition rules set forth in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). As provided in Article 101 of that treaty:
Article 101 1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market (…)
Additionally:
Article 102 Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. (…)
Article 165 (…)3. The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the field of education and sport, in particular the Council of Europe.
In a landmark decision, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that the organization of competitions and the joint exploitation of media rights constitute economic activities subject to competition rules, emphasizing that the exercise of regulatory power by private entities must comply with transparent, objective, non-discriminatory, and proportionate criteria, especially when such entities also act as organizers of their own tournaments.
In Brazil, although in a different context, a discussion likewise related to the associative dynamics of the industry was recently reviewed by Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) in the case involving the establishment of the Liga do Futebol Brasileiro (Libra) and the Liga Forte União (LFU). The authority reaffirmed the full applicability of the Brazilian Competition Law over sports and understood that the collective commercialization of broadcasting rights constitutes an economic activity subject to prior review, treating such arrangements as associative structures among competing clubs aimed at the joint exploitation of the football product. When examining the concrete competitive effects of these initiatives, CADE acknowledged, in the Libra case, that the transaction had been implemented prior to competition clearance, thereby reinforcing the importance of compliance with prior control rules. As in the European experience, centralized governance was not rejected but rather subjected to competition law parameters in order to assess how coordination among clubs operates, considering that, although rivals on the field, they act as competitors in the commercial exploitation of football, as well as the existence of a common undertaking aimed at the collective commercialization of broadcasting rights, the sharing of risks and economic results among participants, the duration of the arrangement, and the fulfillment of the turnover thresholds established in Article 88 of Law No. 12.529/2011 for the purposes of mandatory notification.
The comparison between the two experiences reveals convergence as to the full applicability of Competition Law but also highlights relevant distinctions regarding the focus of the analysis.
In Europe, scrutiny concentrated on the exercise of regulatory power by private entities that that simultaneously act as regulators and economic operators (such as FIFA and UEFA), combining normative and commercial functions, with a potential risk of market foreclosure, a concern typical of vertical dynamics.
In Brazil, attention turned to potential effects of horizontal coordination among competing clubs and to the competitive impacts of collective rights sales, particularly regarding the timing and conditions of the implementation of such arrangements. In this regard, the CADE, in the course of its analysis, understood that the establishment of these leagues constitutes an associative agreement among competing clubs in the commercial exploitation of football, which began to coordinate the collective sale of broadcasting rights. The authority further held that collective commercialization constitutes an economic activity subject to prior merger control. In the Libra case, CADE therefore identified the implementation of the arrangement prior to its notification and approval by the authority, characterizing the practice of gun jumping, in violation of the prior notification requirement established under Brazilian Competition Law (Law No. 12.529/2011).
Nevertheless, in both contexts it is reaffirmed that centralized governance structures bringing together competing undertakings around a common interest, provided that they are structured in a transparent manner and are compatible with the competition parameters applicable in each jurisdiction.
Coauthored by: Patricia Agra Araujo, João Pedro Marques de Gracia Borges and Larissa Ferreira Cristina Melo
